Jeffrey Shulman
Georgetown University Law Center

A Defining Faith: "True" Religion and the Establishment Clause

Introduction
This essay examines two trends in modern church-state law. Parts I and II review
the history of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause cases. It is a history that can
best be understood as a series of jurisprudential maneuvers by which the Court has sought
to make room for religion in civic life. The accommodations made by the Court to
religious belief and conduct have, in effect, allowed for discrimination against nonreligion, and have edged the court toward a nonpreferentialist perspective on
disestablishment. But the Court’s accommodating attitude amounts to more than a
preference for the many varieties of religious experience. That preference is itself
premised on the privileged position of what might be called normative religion. By
adopting a majoritarian approach to church-state controversies, the Court has put the
power, prestige, and financial support of the government behind a traditional religious
consensus--behind, in other words, the conventional theism that dominates our cultural
heritage. Surprisingly, this religious "settlement" may be threatened not by separationist
sentiment, but by the Court's own reluctance to define religion in narrow terms. In Part
III of this essay, I consider the expansive approach the Court has taken to the problem of
defining religion. Taken together, these two trends pose a significant problem for the
Court's accommodationist strategy: by expanding the constitutional definition of religion
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to include minority faiths, the Court risks undermining the normative religious consensus
it has sought to encourage. In Part IV, I explore this threat to the Court's increasingly
nonpreferentialist perspective. The courts have struggled with the "most delicate
question"1 of defining religion in a bewildering variety of Establishment Clause cases.
The significance of the definitional question, however, goes beyond the specifics of any
one case. As the Supreme Court continues to retreat from a position of separationism, the
pressure to define what is religion--that is, what faith is "in" (and entitled to government
support) and what faith is "out"--will inevitably increase. A broad definition of religion
will mean a wide variety of claimants for government support, including some whose
beliefs will not be tolerable to mainstream believers. When witches and Satanists are
entitled to the same privileges that Christians receive from the government, the political
premises of nonpreferentialism would seem to be poorly served. And, in a strange twist
of constitutional history, the very principles by which nonpreferentialists have sought to
support religious practice may prompt a reconsideration of the virtue of high and
impregnable walls.

I
The history of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause cases is a record of
considerable ingenuity. The Court has tried out "a number of unique, and often sharply
juxtaposed approaches"2 in its effort to reconcile the claims of church and state. On one
side of the jurisprudential spectrum the strict separationists insist that "the effect of the
[Establishment Clause] was to take every form of propagation of religion out of the realm
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Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
JOHN WITTE, Jr., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 152 (2000).
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of things which could directly or indirectly be made public business."3 The other end of
the spectrum is occupied by those who claim that the Constitution, far from prohibiting
government support of religion, "affirmatively mandates" it.4 As befits a spectrum, this
one has a range of theoretical options designed to bring some measure of sense (or, at
least, peace) to warring constitutional camps.
The conflict in disestablishment law has resulted in a number of familiar "tests"
(with assorted variations, and variations on the variations) to determine when some
governmental activity has violated the Establishment Clause. The imprecision of these
tests has drawn "heavy criticism since their creation."5 But the record is not as
inconsistent or improvisational as it might appear. In fact, there is a method to the
"massive jumble of . . . doctrines and rules"6 that forms the law of disestablishment: the
method of a somewhat disorderly retreat from the Constitution's foundational principle of
church-state separation.
The fortunes of great ideas often rest on a fragile base of metaphor. Jefferson's
wall of separation was the symbolic foundation for Justice Black's ringing assertion in
Everson v. Board of Education that "[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. . . . In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall
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Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 26 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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of separation between Church and State.'"7 The wall has been crumbling for some time.8
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, Chief Justice Burger reduced Jefferson's libertarian edifice to
something less than wall-like: "[T]he line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a
blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular
relationship."9 The demise of this particular exercise in judicial imagery came to a rather
ignominious end in Lynch v. Donnelly, where Chief Justice Burger observed that the
concept of a wall is merely "a useful figure of speech."10 "The metaphor itself," the Chief
Justice cautioned, "is not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the
relationship that in fact exists between church and state."11
For the Lynch majority, the practical aspects of that relationship meant "the
reality" that total separation of church and state was not possible.12 This was not just a
matter of practicality, however; it was a constitutional mandate: "Nor does the
Constitution require complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates
accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward
any."13 It appears that we should be in the business of building bridges, not walls.14
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8
See William Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall--A Comment on
Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 781 (1984) ("The wall of separation between church and state has
been breached by a clear governmental, politicized, symbiotic embrace of one faith's preferred holy day.").
9
403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
10
465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
11
Id.
12
Id. at 672.
13
Id. at 673.
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confusion here. Or that Establishment Clause jurisprudence has become an especially challenging circus
act of constitutional interpretation.
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The quick collapse of Jefferson's wall should not have been unexpected. Like
other famous walls, it was never quite as "high and impregnable"15 as it appeared to be.
In 1947, it seemed that a strict separation of church and state was constitutionally
required. The Everson Court can certainly lay claim to having established the highwater
mark of separationist rhetoric. But, though the Everson majority promised not to approve
even "the slightest breach" in Jefferson's wall,16 the separationist rhetoric of that decision
receded before a tide of practicality. Black's words delivered less than they promised,
and, of course, the Court held that New Jersey's reimbursement scheme did not violate
the Establishment Clause.17 Under certain circumstances, it seems that government could
"pass laws which aid . . . all religions."18
Those circumstances deserve some attention: they would become the tools by
which the Court would dismantle Jefferson's metaphor as a constitutional principle.
First, the Establishment Clause, Black asserted, "requires the state to be neutral in
it relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the
state to be their adversary."19 Though New Jersey could not “consistently with the
'establishment of religion clause' of the First Amendment contribute tax-raised funds to
the support of an institution which teaches the tenets and faith of any church," it could not
consistent with the Free Exercise clause exclude individual believers "because of their
faith . . . from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation."20 Used this way,
"neutrality" means equal access--equal access, that is, to government support--for
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religious and non-religious groups. In Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York,
Justice Harlan elaborated on this "equal protection" model of neutrality:
Neutrality in its application requires an equal protection mode of analysis. The
Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental categories to
eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders. In any particular case the critical
question is whether the circumference of legislation encircles a class so broad that
it can be fairly concluded that religious institutions could be thought to fall within
the natural perimeter.21
Neutrality, in this sense, is inclusive: it asks whether government has inappropriately
excluded religion, not whether government has inappropriately advanced religion. It is in
this sense that the Court considers neutrality to be benevolent.22
Second, though Black acknowledged the benefit that parochial schools would
derive from the reimbursement program, this conformity with an outcome favorable to
religion was merely a secondary effect, one that was incidental to or overlapped with the
primary purpose of the state action. This incidental or overlapping effect could be a
considerable one. Black conceded that not only was it "undoubtedly true that children are
helped to get to church schools" by the state's transportation program, but "[t]here is even
a possibility that some of the children might not be sent to the church schools if the
parents were compelled to pay their children's bus fares out of their own pockets when
transportation to a public school would have been paid for by the State."23 Nonetheless,
Black was prepared to accept the principle that the advancement of religion may be an
acceptable byproduct of government action.24
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Third, any Establishment Clause objections to the bus fare program were
diminished by the fact that the reimbursement scheme channeled state assistance to
individual parents: "The State contributes no money to the schools. It does not support
them. Its legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a general program to help
parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and
from accredited schools."25 Black pointed out that the Court "has said that parents may
. . . send their children to a religious rather than a public school";26 the New Jersey bus
fare program merely offered parents a way to carry out the individual choices sanctioned
by the Court.
In short order, Black stated the major conceptual underpinnings of the Court's
retreat from separationism. In cases involving aid to parochial education,27 religious
inclusion in public subsidy schemes,28 equal access,29 religious ritual and symbolism,30
the themes of inclusive or benevolent neutrality, incidental or overlapping effect, and
individual choice would form a major part of the analytical foundation for the Court's
increasingly accommodationist sentiment.
The possibility that Everson breached the wall it purported to erect did not go
unremarked. For Justice Jackson, "the undertones of the opinion, advocating complete
and uncompromising separation of Church and State seem[ed] utterly discordant with its
25
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conclusion yielding support to their commingling in educational matters."31 Jackson
considered the "absolute terms"32 of the Establishment Clause ("[I]ts strength is its
rigidity."33) to be necessitated by the unique volatility of religious controversy: the
Establishment Clause "was intended not only to keep the states' hands out of religion, but
to keep religion's hands off the state, and above all, to keep bitter religious controversy
out of public life by denying to every denomination any advantage from getting control
of public policy or the public purse."34 By its very nature, religion cannot be made part
of the public business:

The effect of the religious freedom Amendment to our Constitution was to take
every form of propagation of religion out of the realm of things which could
directly or indirectly be made public business and thereby be supported in whole
or in part at taxpayers' expense. That is a difference which the Constitution sets up
between religion and almost every other subject matter of legislation.35

That difference, according to Justice Rutledge, requires the Court "to create a
complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority
by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion."36 Like
Justice Jackson, Justice Rutledge advocated a "root and branch"37 approach to
disestablishment. Relying on Madison, Rutledge argued that religion, as a matter of
private conscience, is "wholly beyond the scope of civil power either to restrain or to
support."38 Where Jackson focused on the public order, Rutledge stressed how religious
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conflict could suppress private religious exercise. State aid, according to Rutledge,
would be as destructive of religious freedom as state interference.39
Justice Rutledge worried that one breach could lead to others: "This is not
therefore just a little case over bus fares. In paraphrase of Madison, distant as it may be in
its present form from a complete establishment of religion, it differs from it only in
degree; and is the first step in that direction."40 It is against the language of the Everson
dissenters that we must chart the course of the Court's modern Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. They brought more than stylistic flourish to the Court. Underlying their
contention that the Establishment Clause mandated a radical separationism was neutrality
of a different sort: the prohibition of any government activity that aided religion.41
In Everson, Justice Jackson noted, with a good deal of understatement, that "[t]his
policy of our Federal Constitution has never been wholly pleasing to most religious
groups."42 This policy has never been wholly pleasing to a majority of the Supreme
Court, either.

II
At times, the Court's accommodationst sentiment has taken the form of a direct
assault on the idea that the Constitution requires the separation of church and state. Most
notably, Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree sought to refute the notion
39

Id. at 40.
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that Madison understood the Establishment clause as "requiring neutrality on the part of
government between religion and irreligion."43 Rehnquist's analysis of the historical
record was clear and certain: "There is simply no historical foundation for the
proposition that the Framers intended to build the 'wall of separation' that was
constitutionalized in Everson." To Rehnquist, it seems indisputable that Madison saw the
Establishment Clause as designed only "to prohibit the establishment of a national
religion, and perhaps to prevent discrimination among sects."44 (Justice Rehnquist's
begrudging "perhaps" suggests that his nonpreferentialism may be a tactical position.
Perhaps the First Amendment does not prevent governmental discrimination among the
sects. Or, perhaps, the question turns on how we define a sect. If certain sects are
defined as non-religious, the Establishment Clause would not prohibit discriminatory
government toward them.45)
For the most part, however, the constitutional privileging of religion has taken a
less direct form. One of the most effective means by which the Court has elevated
religion to a position of special status has been a refusal to acknowledge religious
behavior as religious. In other words, certain forms of religious behavior are seen as so
normative that they cease to be visible. They certainly cease to be objectionable. Thus,
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472 U.S. 38, 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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we have a long string of cases that, while adhering to the principle that the Establishment
Clause "requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of believers and nonbelievers alike," contends that such neutrality does not prohibit government support of
certain religious practices.
Some of these are the practices that have come to be referred to as ceremonial
deism.46 The designation of "In God We Trust" as our national motto, the phrase "Under
God" in the Pledge of Allegiance--these types of religious expression are thought to be
protected from Establishment Clause scrutiny. Writing in dissent in Lynch v. Donnelly,
Justice William Brennan suggested that this protection derived from the fact that through
"rote repetition" these practices have lost "any significant religious content."47 It is
curious that the more pervasive a practice the less constitutional significance it has, and
curiouser48 that Brennan would go on to say that "these references are uniquely suited to
such wholly secular purposes as solemnizing public occasions, or inspiring commitment
to meet some national challenge in a manner that simply could not be fully served in our
culture if government were limited to purely non-religious practices."49 One might think
that the unique serviceability of these references owed something to their continuing
religious vitality. The fact that God's name is used as a form of rote repetition--that is,
the fact that the majority could not imagine that the use of God's name could be offensive
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See Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083
(1996).
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465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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to anyone--only testifies to how firmly established theistic religion has become (and how
effectively ceremonial deism erases minority religious sentiments).50
Writing for the Court in Lynch, Chief Justice Burger did not share Justice
Brennan's uncertainty about the constitutionality of this type of ceremonial practice, and
he did not share Justice Brennan's belief that such practices had "an essentially secular
meaning."51 The Chief Justice detailed "a history replete" with "official" practices
embracing religion."52 Citing Justice Douglas's observation in Zorach v. Clauson that
"[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being,"53 Chief
Justice Burger embraced the continuing religious vitality of such "official references to
the value and invocation of Divine guidance."54 It is that vitality that accounts for their
continuation. Noting that "President Washington and his successors proclaimed
Thanksgiving, with all its religious overtones, a day of national celebration and Congress
made it a National Holiday more than a century ago,"55 Burger hastened to add that the
Thanksgiving holiday "has not lost its theme of expressing thanks for Divine aid any
more than Christmas has lost its religious significance."56
There is a candor here absent from Brennan's contrived notion that the
omnipresence of religious practices somehow causes them to become non-religious. "[I]t
is clear that Government has long recognized--indeed it has subsidized--holidays with
religious significance."57 For Chief Justice Burger (as, in later decisions, for Justices
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To be fair, Brennan did note that he "remain[ed] uncertain about these questions." Id. at 716.
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Kennedy and Scalia58), tradition has a way of validating itself. In the case of public
ceremonies featuring religious conduct, history also reveals "the contemporaneous
understanding"59 of the guarantees offered by the Establishment Clause. History, it is
argued, can teach us the common sense of a complicated matter.60
Thus, as Justice Kennedy wrote, "[a] test for implementing the protections of the
Establishment Clause that, if applied with consistency, would invalidate longstanding
traditions cannot be a proper reading of the Clause."61 Here, Kennedy acknowledges an
Establishment Clause test that has not gained the attention of its more familiar analytical
cousins. We can test the constitutionality of government action, it appears, by analogy to
forms of conduct that we somehow know pass muster. Burger used this "It's no worse
than" test in Lynch to find that though a nativity scene "is identified with one religious
faith,"62 it is "no more so than the examples we have set out from our prior cases in which
we found no conflict with the Establishment Clause."63 This test has the advantage of
saving the Court from the considerable task of considering whether previous cases were
wisely decided. "If the presence of the crèche in this display violates the Establishment
Clause," Burger observed in Lynch without a hint of irony, "a host of other forms of
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For Kennedy, see, for example, County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573,
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taking official note of Christmas, and our religious heritage, are equally offensive to the
Constitution."64 That, self-evidently, could not be the case.
Or, if it were the case, it may be too late to do anything about it. A longstanding
practice, like the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer, may over time
"become a part of the fabric of our society."65 Thus, the real threat to society, in a case
like Marsh v. Chambers, would be the disruption caused by an Establishment Clause
challenge. The threat posed by Nebraska's tradition of legislative prayer, on the other
hand, would be a mere shadow66: "To invoke Divine guidance on a public body
entrusted with making the laws is not, in these circumstances, an 'establishment' of
religion or a step toward establishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of
beliefs widely held among the people of this country."67
The challenge to ceremonial deism has come (at least, in large part) from
nonbelievers.68 For the nonpreferentialist camp, "nothing in the Establishment Clause
requires government to be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion."69 So, from
this perspective, the nonbeliever is not constitutionally offended when, for instance, the
government amends the Pledge of Allegiance to include the phrase "under God." But
nonpreferentialism stands for the proposition (Rehnquist's "perhaps" notwithstanding)
that the government may not discriminate among sects. Given that, could a believer who
64
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does not believe in God be constitutionally offended by the Pledge? If so, then the
Pledge would fail even by nonpreferentialist standards. Thus, it is critical for the
nonpreferentialist to maintain the Brennan-type fiction that certain religion references
have lost their religious vitality or the Burger- type posture that the government can
support religious norms.70
But times, and cultural norms, change, and there may come a time (there will
come a time) when ceremonies like the Pledge are challenged by followers of nontheistic faiths. That time will come, in part, because the Court has determined that nontheistic systems of belief are, for constitutional purpose, valid religions.
What, then, is a nonpreferentialist to do?

III
Faced with conduct that cannot be dismissed as ceremonial, the Court has sought
some mechanism (beyond resorting to history) to make religion a part of the public
business. In this regard, the Court has tried out several different tests--most notably for
purposes of this essay, the Lemon71 and endorsement72 tests.
Both tests read the Establishment Clause in less than absolute terms. Where
Justice Jackson considered the rigidity of the Establishment Clause as the source of its
strength, these tests muddy the constitutional waters. They begin by assuming that the
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language of the Establishment Clause is " at best opaque,"73 and they proceed by
formulating a set of analytical tools that encourage--indeed, require--highly subjective
(and, at times, intensely personal) judicial judgments. Intentionally or not, the effect of
these tests has been to allow greater governmental accommodation for religion.
The Lemon test reflects, in part, the separationist sentiment of the Everson
dissenters. By allowing the courts to consider purpose and entanglement as well as
effect, the test provides a way to invalidate government activities that might otherwise
pass constitutional muster. Indeed, during the 1970s and early 1980s, the Lemon test was
used to strike down several government programs.74
But the Lemon court hedges its bets a bit too much. It objects to governmental
action with a principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion; it objects to
excessive governmental entanglement with religion. These qualifiers would lead
(probably inevitably) to inconsistent results. The purpose prong, too, is an invitation to
speculation, if not outright guessing, about legislative motive.75 More subjective than its
multi-part analytical structure might suggest, the Lemon test could be a useful device to
support religion in accommodationist hands. The Lemon test was employed, to cite one
instance, in Lynch, where the Court upheld a city-sponsored nativity scene.76 (The
district and appellate courts had used the same test to come to the opposite conclusion.77)
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If the Lemon test allows for greater governmental accommodation of religion, the
endorsement test insists upon it. The endorsement standard is a model of heavy-handed
wordplay: rather than ask whether the government has a secular purpose, "[t]he proper
inquiry . . . is whether the government intends to convey a message of endorsement or
disapproval of religion"78; rather than ask whether the government action has a primary
effect that advances or inhibits religion, we ask whether a government action has "the
effect of communicating a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion."79 So,
government action can have a non-secular purpose and can have a primary effect that
advances religion without running afoul of the Establishment Clause, provided that there
is no communication of endorsement. The focus of our attention, thus, is no longer the
state's conduct--the medium is now truly the message. To focus on the government's
communicative intent is to render establishment law little more than a form of judicial
intuition.80 Government may not have spoken clearly. Perhaps it did not mean what it
said. The listener, relying (naively, one supposes) "on the words themselves,"81 may
receive a message not actually intended. To focus on communicative effect is to make
establishment law a muddle of impressions and perceptions. Endorsement is in the eye
or, more accurately, in the (hurt) feelings of the observer.82
The endorsement test was embraced by the Court in Allegheny because it
"provide[d] a sound analytical framework for evaluating governmental use of religious
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symbols."83 It might be of some value, therefore, to see how the test's originator, Justice
O'Connor, used that framework in Lynch. Having announced that the proper inquiry
under the purpose prong of Lemon is whether government intends to convey a message of
endorsement of religion, O'Connor applies her formulation to the facts of this case:

I would find that Pawtucket did not intend to convey any message of endorsement
of Christianity or disapproval of nonChristian religions. The evident purpose of
including the crèche in the larger display was not promotion of the religious
content but celebration of the public holiday through its traditional symbols.
Celebration of public holidays, which have cultural significance even if they also
have religious aspects, is a legitimate secular purpose.84

The sound analytical framework here amounts to judicial fiat: the purpose of the
including the crèche is "evident"--and it is not endorsement. Not just fiat about the
purpose of the display, but about its perception. The crèche does not convey a message
of endorsement because "[t]he display celebrates a public holiday, and no one contends
that declaration of that holiday is understood to be an endorsement of religion."85
Beyond a statement of what she considers to be self-evident, O'Connor's
analytical framework offers little more than the indiscriminate use of strategies designed
to support government advancement of religion. Her version of the Lemon effect prong
is a grab bag of such interpretative maneuvers. Consider one passage striking for its
analytical versatility and compactness. Reviewing the effect of the nativity scene,
O'Connor fires off a volley of anti-separationist arguments: 1) "It's no worse than"
("These features combine to make the government's display of the crèche in this
83

492 U.S. at 595.
465 U.S. at 691.
85
Id. at 692. O'Connor notes, at 693, the significance of the fact that the display "caused no political
divisiveness prior to the filing of the lawsuit." But see Feldman, supra, note 60, at 863 ("[The] Court
overlooked the possibility [that] Christian cultural imperialism had produced the silence of religious
outgroup members.").
84

18

particular physical setting no more an endorsement of religion than such governmental
'acknowledgments' of religion as legislative prayers of the type approved in Marsh v.
Chambers, government declaration of Thanksgiving as a public holiday, printing of 'In
God We Trust' on coins, and opening court sessions with 'God save the United States and
this honorable court.'"); 2) ceremonial deism ("Those government acknowledgments of
religion serve, in the only ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular
purposes of solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and
encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society."); and 3) history
and tradition ("For that reason, and because of their history and ubiquity, those practices
are not understood as conveying government approval of particular religious beliefs. The
display of the crèche likewise serves a secular purpose--celebration of a public holiday
with traditional symbols. It cannot fairly be understood to convey a message of
government endorsement of religion.")86
The endorsement test turns Lemon on its head: government action that is
designed to advance religion--even action that has the effect of advancing religion--may
be permissible. "Focusing on the evil of government endorsement or disapproval of
religion makes clear that the effect prong of the Lemon test is properly interpreted not to
require invalidation of a government practice because it in fact causes, even as a primary
effect, advancement or inhibition of religion.” Beyond validating the accommodationist
results of prior decisions (“The laws upheld in [Walz, McGowan, and Zorach] had such
effects, but they did not violate the Establishment Clause."87), the endorsement test
extended an invitation to the Court to uphold government conduct that advances religion
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based on some belief about the way that conduct is perceived by some undefined group.
In Lynch, O'Connor avoided the problem of defining whose perception she was talking
about by using the passive voice with a vengeance: "These practices are not understood
as conveying government approval of particular religious beliefs. The display of the
crèche . . . cannot fairly be understood to convey a message of government endorsement
of religion." In Wallace, O'Connor clarified this aspect of the endorsement test by
suggesting the relevant issue is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text,
legislative history, and implementation of the state action, would perceive it as an
endorsement of religion.88 The objective reader might be forgiven for wondering who
besides a member of the judiciary would be so qualified,89 or for considering the fact that
"judges will always be broadly representative of the general population, and will be
susceptible to all the distortions of interpretation that membership in the majority
entails."90
It is no exaggeration to say that O'Connor's invitation was readily accepted.91 The
endorsement test has had a major impact on the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, both directly (in cases like Allegheny, where the majority adopted it as its
88
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mode of analysis) and indirectly (in cases like Agostini, where endorsement principles
resulted in new criteria used to evaluate whether government aid has the effect of
advancing religion92).
By substituting a vague, judicially-defined majoritarianism for the neutrality of
the Lemon test, the O'Connor test erases the perceptions of anyone who does perceive
endorsement. Their perception, O'Connor would have to say, is wrong. It would be more
honest to say that their perception does not matter. Thus, the endorsement test allows for
a form of indirect governmental coercion. Justice Black, writing for the Court in Engel v.
Vitale, recognized that government support of religious conduct can "operate indirectly to
coerce nonobserving individuals."93 "When the power, prestige and financial support of
the government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive
pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved
religion is plain."94 The Court has relied on the principle that "at a minimum, the
Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate
in religion or its exercise."95 Government support of religion is no less so because the
majority fails to perceive that conduct as an endorsement of religion--that fact serves only
to intensify the offense.96
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In this respect, in its implicit concession to majority sentiment, the endorsement
test is of a piece with other means by which the Court secures constitutional
accommodation with religion. Ceremonial deism is most obviously a concession to the
religious norm. The ubiquity of a religious practice ought to testify to its power and
continuing vitality (a power and vitality seen when such a practice is challenged).
Instead, by some distortion of common sense, the pervasiveness of a practice becomes
evidence of its innocuousness. No reasonable person could object to what so many
people say or do as a matter of course. Focusing on history and tradition likewise means
transforming what is normative into what is unobjectionable. More indirectly, the
endorsement test confirms the normativeness of the perceptions of the religious majority.
Taken together, these accommodationist strategies, by permitting the distribution of
government recognition and benefits to religious groups, have enabled the Court to adopt
a de facto preferentialism in the name of neutrality and choice.97
It is misleading to speak of the religious majority as an abstract entity. In our
society, the religion of the majority is Christianity. The "God" of ceremonial deism the
God of our national religious traditions, the God who benefits most from government
recognition is the God worshipped by Christians. To the extent that the Court has chosen
a majoritarian approach to disestablishment law, it has promoted "Christian
ethnocentrism."98 To the extent that other religions worship God (the same or some
variant of the Christian God), we might say that the religion of the majority is theistic.
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Both Jews and Christians can pledge their allegiance to one nation under God. (The
erasure of other religious beliefs is nowhere better seen than when the Court denominates
prayer to God as nonsectarian.) Thus, the success of the accommodationist argument is
really a success for Christianity and, more broadly, for a hegemonic theism. It is here,
however, that the trend in a related area of the law--the judicial definition of religion-may threaten the effort to make religion a foundational feature of our public life. Some
of the varieties of religious experience may not be able to be accommodated, at least not
without calling into question the judicial arguments and political premises upon which
government support for mainstream religion is based.

III
On December 6, 2002, Cyndi Simpson filed suit in federal district court against
the Chesterfield County, Virginia, Board of Supervisors.99 Simpson had volunteered to
lead prayer at one of the board's meetings. The board declined her offer.
It was not that the Board of Supervisors was averse to beginning a public meeting
with a religious message. In fact, every meeting of the board begins with such an
invocation. "Local ministers, priests and the occasional rabbi, each of whom has
volunteered to be on a list, offer words of inspiration before the meeting shifts to zoning
laws, budget cuts and public hearings. It's been that way for years."100
The problem is that Simpson is a witch.
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Cyndi Simpson is a Wiccan priestess. "According to Simpson . . ., Wicca is a
peaceful, life-affirming and nature-based religion that focuses on the seasons and what
they bring to people's lives. It has many variations among its followers--some traditions
are practiced only by women--but one core belief is recognition of divinity in feminine
forms."101 In Chesterfield County, however, Wicca is not a religion at all. The chairman
of the board determined that Wicca "is basically a non-religion."102 Or, at least, it is not a
religion of the kind that deserves constitutional protection. The attorney for the county
argued that the board's "nonsectarian invocations are traditionally made to a divinity that
is consistent with the Judeo- Christian tradition. . . . Based upon our review of Wicca, it is
neo-pagan and invokes polytheistic, pre-Christian deities."103
No one is preventing Simpson from freely exercising her religious rights; the
action of the board does not implicate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Nor is the practice of legislative prayer itself a constitutional violation. But the board
may well be in violation of the Establishment Clause--if, in fact, Wicca is a religion.
Thus, the question central to this dispute is a definitional one: what is a religion for
Establishment Clause purposes?
The case of Cyndi Simpson is suggestive of what may lie ahead. In Marsh v.
Chambers, the Supreme Court held that legislative prayer "ha[d] become a part of the
fabric of our society."104 The practice of legislative prayer, which the Marsh Court found
"a tolerable acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among the people of this
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country,"105 was not seen as threatening the principles embedded in the Establishment
Clause. However, as the religious beliefs held by the people of this country become more
diverse, legislatures will be challenged by more suits of the kind facing the Chesterfield
County Board of Supervisors. While legislative prayer may be constitutionally valid, it is
not clear how the Court could permit a legislature to favor one religion over another.
Such a position should be offensive even to the nonpreferentialists on the Court.106 So, if
Wicca is a religion, the Court will have to allow witches their chance to lead the Board of
Supervisors in an opening prayer, one that invokes a divinity, it is safe to say, foreign to
most of the residents of Chesterfield County. The prospect of an accommodationist
slippery slope is not hard to imagine. If the followers of God get to have their deity's
name on our nation's currency, will the followers of Satan be long in demanding a similar
benefit?
Of course, the Court could place Wiccans and Satanists outside the sphere of
religion--that is, religion as defined by the Constitution. The case law is a repository of
definitional options that the Court may consider as it treads its way through such murky
territory.
The Court's traditional definition of religion "was closely tied to a belief in
God."107 In 1890, in Davis v. Beason, the Court considered whether the advocacy of

105

Id.
Apparently, the board could choose one person to deliver the invocation year after year, thus preempting
witches (and others) from getting a chance to invoke divine guidance for the county supervisors. In Marsh,
the Court was not bothered by the fact "that a clergyman of only one denomination--Presbyterian--had been
selected for 16 years." 463 U.S. at 793. The Court could not "perceive any suggestion that choosing a
clergyman of one denomination advances the beliefs of a particular church. To the contrary, the evidence
indicates that [the clergyman] was reappointed because his performance and personal qualities were
acceptable to the body appointing him." Id. at 793.
107
Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring)
106

25

bigamy and polygamy was "a tenet of religion."108 Following Madison's assertion that
religion is "the duty which we owe to our creator, and the manner of discharging it,"109
the Court grounded its definition of religion on the existence of a divine creator: "[T]he
term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his relations to this Creator, and to the
obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his
will.."110
The emphasis on duty in the Court's language is also noteworthy. The idea that
religion involves obligation to a creator points in two directions: 1) a content-oriented
definition of religion, and 2) a functional way of defining religion. In Davis, the content
is "divine creator"; the functional element focuses on the subjective experience of the
believer, his sense of duty to that divine creator. Religion imposes a duty higher than that
to civil authority; the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment protect that duty--they
protect freedom of conscience. "The first amendment to the constitution, in declaring
that congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion or forbidding the
free exercise thereof, was intended to allow every one under the jurisdiction of the United
States to entertain such notions respecting his relations to his Maker and the duties they
impose as may be approved by his judgment and conscience."111
But not every sense of duty is religious. The Davis Court observed that religion
"is often confounded with the cultus or form of worship of a particular sect, but is
distinguishable from the latter."112 It is not immediately clear what distinguishes the cult
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practices that the Davis Court says are "proper matters for prohibitory legislation"113 from
appropriate matters of conscience, but the Court seems to rest its distinction on "the
general consent of the Christian world in modern times."114 The distinction should not be
dismissed as a product of an ancient time. The Court is, in effect, defining religion by
analogy, and that approach is by no means an antiquated one. Davis says that a religion
should look like a religion. In 1890, that meant one thing; in 2003, it may mean
something else--but the appeal to some idea of what is normative is not unfamiliar to
modern courts. Polygamy is not a constitutionally-protected religion for the same reason
that forced stomach-pumping is not a constitutionally-protected form of law enforcement:
both shock the conscience. "To extend exemption from punishment for such crimes
would be to shock the moral judgment of the community. To call their advocacy a tenet
of religion is to offend the common sense of mankind."115
Though its language may be quaint, Davis anticipates the main lines by which the
courts have sought to define religion: content, function, and analogy.116 The substantive
legacy of Davis--its focus on duty to a higher power--would also guide the Court as it
struggled to decide what is and is not religion. In 1931, Chief Justice Hughes, dissenting
in United States v. Macintosh, would write that "[t]he essence of religion is belief in a
relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any other human
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relation."117 In Macintosh, the Court upheld the denial of a petition for naturalization on
the ground that the "petitioner would not promise in advance to bear arms in defense of
the United States unless he believed the war to be morally justified."118 But Hughes'
formulation would deeply influence the thinking of the Court when it was confronted
with moral objections to the Vietnam War; and, though the Court would move beyond
the theistic orientation of Davis, in a very real sense it would stay true to its spirit.
The narrow confines of Davis were broadened by the Court in Torcaso v.
Watkins.119 In striking down a requirement that holders of public office declare their
belief in the existence of God, the Court held that "neither a State nor the Federal
Government can constitutionally . . . pass laws or impose requirements which aid all
religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in
the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs."120 In other
words, the Court acknowledged that religion does not mean theism.121 After Torcaso, "a
belief in the existence of God" would no longer be relevant to the protections of the
Establishment Clause.
The most generous definition of religion given by the Supreme Court occurred in
a series of decisions interpreting the Universal Military Training and Service Act.122 The
statute adopted the theme of obligation (borrowing from Hughes's formulation in
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Macintosh) in granting conscientious objector status to persons who were opposed to war
on the basis of "religious training and belief,"123 which was defined as "belief in a relation
to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation."124 In Seeger v. United States, the Court defined the question before it as one
involving that theme: "Our question, therefore, is the narrow one: Does the term
'Supreme Being' as used in [the statute] mean the orthodox God or the broader concept of
a power or being, or a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is
ultimately dependent?"125 For the Seeger court, the fact that Congress used the
expression "Supreme Being" rather than the designation "God" indicated that "religious
training and belief" was meant "to embrace all religions"126:

We believe that under this construction, the test of belief "in a relation to a
Supreme Being" is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies
a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in
God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption. Where such beliefs have
parallel positions in the lives of their respective holders we cannot say that one is
'in a relation to a Supreme Being' and the other is not.127

This "parallel position" definition of religion does not include views that are essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical; and it is not synonymous with "a merely personal
moral code."128 The difference is a matter of conscience. "Within the phrase [religious
training and belief] come all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a power or
being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately
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dependent." 129 In the context of conscientious objection, the Court found that there is a
"duty to a moral power higher than the state"130 where a given belief, like a traditional
religious belief, involves “duties superior to those arising from any other human
relation."
The Seeger decision is commonly cited for its expansive definition of religion,
and, in relying on the work of such modern theologians as Paul Tillich, it did expand the
definition of God; in fact, the Court noted, almost as an afterthought, that "Seeger did not
clearly demonstrate what his beliefs were with regard to the usual understanding of the
term 'Supreme Being.' But as we have said Congress did not intend that to be the test."131
For the traditional idea of God, the Court substituted Tillich's "God above God,"132 the
source of some affirmation of ultimate concern.
But as its reliance on Hughes' opinion in Mackintosh suggests,133 the Seeger
decision was quite orthodox when it proposed that what an objector believes is only
relevant if that belief creates a crisis of conscience--that is, only if the belief involves a
duty higher than that owed to the state. Seeger is, in this sense, a split decision: split
between a broad, even radical, definition of religion from a content orientation, and a
narrow, quite conservative definition from a functional perspective. While a belief or
practice need not be analogous to traditional religion, its place in the heart of the believer
must be. In the case of Seeger himself, the Court found that "the beliefs which prompted
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his objection occupy the same place in his life as the belief in a traditional deity holds in
the lives of his friends, the Quakers."134
It is the subjective nature of the Court's functional equivalent test that makes
Seeger so strikingly generous. Critics of the decision ask on what basis a court would
undertake a psychological or biographical inquiry of a claimant for religious status.135 It
is a reasonable question, but perhaps not one we need bother to ponder. For, following
Tillich, the Court implies that everyone has an ultimate concern. In deciding that
Seeger's belief was functionally equivalent to that of the Quakers, the Court relies on
Tillich's exuberant formulation of the test: "And if that word [God] has not meaning for
you translate it, speak of the depths of your life, of your ultimate concern, of what you
take seriously without reservation."136 This is not an "ultimate concern" test; it is a "your
ultimate concern test."
Tillich's formulation of the ultimate concern is fundamentally at odds with the
notion that religion derives its special constitutional standing from the fact that it imposes
on its adherents a higher duty than those arising from human relations; and, thus, Seeger
is a decision fundamentally at odds with itself. It proposes to distinguish religion from
philosophy because the former is based on matters that really matter, but it left us with a
radically subjective definition of what really matters. This oddness is reflected in two
later Supreme Court cases. In 1970, the Welsh Court took another generous step,
bringing "intensely personal convictions" within the sphere of religion if "they are held
with the strength of traditional religious convictions."137 But, in 1972, in Wisconsin v.
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Yoder, the Court stated that philosophical and personal beliefs, no matter how deeply felt,
do "not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses."138 In the case of Henry David
Thoreau, the Court's generosity had run out.139
Because the Supreme Court seems to be of two minds about what constitutes a
tenet of religion, the lower courts, not surprisingly, are also split on what approach to
take. Some have adopted a Tillich-like "inward mentor" standard that focuses on the
individual's relationship with what he considers to be divine.140 Others have chosen a
more systematic approach. In Malnak v. Yogi, the Third Circuit determined that the
teaching of Transcendental Meditation in the public schools was violative of the
Establishment Clause.141 In his concurring opinion, Judge Adams employed "three useful
indicia" that would indicate whether a particular group or cluster of ideas was a
religion.142 Working by analogy, Adams looked to "the familiar religions as models in
order to ascertain, by comparison, whether the new set of ideas or beliefs is confronting
the same concerns, or serving the same purposes, as unquestioned as accepted
'religions.'"143 The first and most important indicator is "the nature of the ideas in
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the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond,
their claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal rather
than religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses."
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See, e.g., United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1227 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[U]nder the Religion
Clauses, everyone is entitled to entertain such view respecting his relations to what he considers the divine
and the duties such relationship imposes as may be approved by that person's conscience.").
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Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
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Id. at 208 (Adams, J., concurring).
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Id. at 207.
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question."144 Like the Seeger Court, Adams relied on the connection made by Tillich
between religion and ultimate concerns, concepts (in Adams' words) "that are of the
greatest depth and utmost importance."145 However, "certain isolated answers to
'ultimate' questions . . . are not necessarily 'religious' answers, because they lack the
element of comprehensiveness, the second of the three indicia."146 Adams writes that
religion "is not generally confined to one question or one moral teaching; it has a broader
scope."147 The third of Adams' indicia was "any formal, external, or surface signs that
may be analogized to accepted religions"148 These signs, Adams observes, "can be
helpful in supporting a conclusion of religious status given the important role such
ceremonies play in religious life."149
Similarly, the district court in United States v. Meyers,150 considering the
defendant's claim that drug use was a central tenet of his religion ("The Church of
Marijuana"), sought to avoid judicial subjectivity by listing several "minimal
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Id. at 208.
Id. ("One's views, be they orthodox or novel, on the deeper and more imponderable questions on the
meaning of life and death, man's role in the Universe, the proper moral code of right and wrong are those
likely to be the most 'intensely personal' and important to the believer. They are his ultimate concerns. As
such, they are to be carefully guarded from governmental interference, and never converted into official
government doctrine. The first amendment demonstrates a specific solicitude for religion because religious
ideas are in many ways more important than other ideas. New and different ways of meeting those
concerns are entitled to the same sort of treatment as the traditional forms government doctrine. The first
amendment demonstrates a specific solicitude for religion because religious ideas are in many ways more
important than other ideas. New and different ways of meeting those concerns are entitled to the same sort
of treatment as the traditional forms.")
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Id. at 208-209.
147
Id. at 209. ("Thus the so-called 'Big Bang' theory, an astronomical interpretation of the creation of the
universe, may be said to answer an 'ultimate' question, but it is not, by itself, a 'religious' idea. Likewise,
moral or patriotic views are not by themselves 'religious,' but if they are pressed as divine law or a part of a
comprehensive belief-system that presents them as 'truth,' they might well rise to the religious level.")
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Id. ("Such signs might include formal services, ceremonial functions, the existence of clergy, structure
and organization, efforts at propagation, observation of holidays and other similar manifestations associated
with the traditional religions. Of course, a religion may exist without any of these signs, so they are not
determinative, at least by their absence, in resolving a question of definition.")
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Id.
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906 F. Supp. 1494 (D.Wyo. 1995), aff'd, 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 583
(1997).
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threshold"151 factors that would warrant a court in deciding that a belief is religious
(though the absence of these factors would not mean that a belief was not religious).152
Under this "low-threshold 'inclusion test,'"153 the court presumed "that the following sets
of beliefs are 'religious'":

Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Shintoism, Confucianism, and
Taoism. Undoubtedly, the test also would lead to the conclusion that the beliefs of
the following groups are "religious": Hare Krishnas, Bantus, Mormons, Seventh
Day Adventists, Christian Scientists, Scientologists, Branch Davidians,
Unification Church Members, and Native American Church Members (whether
Shamanists or Ghost Dancers). More likely than not, the test also includes obscure
beliefs such as Paganism, Zoroastrianism, Pantheism, Animism, Wicca, Druidism,
Satanism, and Santeria. And, casting a backward glance over history, the test
assuredly would have included what we now call "mythology": Greek religion,
Norse religion, and Roman religion.154

With a sense of humor (one hopes) the court asked the "obvious question: Is anything
excluded?"155 The not-so-obvious answer: "Purely personal, political, ideological, or
secular beliefs probably would not satisfy enough criteria for inclusion.). Examples of
such beliefs are: nihilism, anarchism, pacifism, utopianism, socialism, libertarianism,
Marxism, vegetism, and humanism."156 And, lest it be forgotten, "The Church of
Marijuana."157
Where does that leave Cyndi Simpson, the Wiccan who wants to lead the board of
supervisors in prayer? In Dettmer v. Landon, the Fourth Circuit held that "the Church of
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Id. at 1502.
Id. at 1502-1503. These factors were: ultimate ideas, metaphysical beliefs, moral or ethical system,
comprehensiveness of beliefs, and accoutrements of beliefs.
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Id. at 1503.
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Id.
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Id. at 1504.
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Id. Cf. Africa v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d. 1025, 1036 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that the
naturalist MOVE organization "is not a religion for purposes of the religion clauses").
157
Id. at 1508-1509.
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Wicca is a religion."158 The decision employed both the subjective measure of religion
(Seeger's functional equivalent test) and the more objective criteria of such cases as
Malnak and Myers. The court found that "the district court properly considered whether
the Church occupies a place in the lives of its members 'parallel to that filled by the
orthodox belief in God' in religions more widely accepted in the United States."159 The
district court also properly considered the fact that that members of the Church of Wicca
adhere to doctrines that concern ultimate questions of human life, doctrines that "parallel
those of more conventional religions."160 It should be noted that the district court paid
scant attention to the idea of duty. There was no mention of "a power or being . . . to
which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent." The parallel
position doctrine of Seeger was completely divorced from the sense of moral struggle
that justified special treatment of religious belief and conduct.
The Dettmer court relied on objective measures as well, holding that the district
court appropriately took into consideration that "the Church's doctrines teach ceremonies
parallel to those of recognized religions"; that Church members "seek guidance from
Wiccan leaders and study "the doctrines of the Church of Wicca as expressed by these
leaders in books, pamphlets, and a correspondence course of study"; that witchcraft has
its own history; and that there are between 10,000 and 100,000 adherents in America.161
Regardless of analytical approach, the lower courts no longer make the Davis
"higher duty" rationale the primary focus of their concern. Rather, cases like Dettmer
reflect a tendency to protect freedom of conscience by assuring equal treatment for
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minority religious groups. The liberal spirit of the lower courts does not mean that every
claimant for religious status will qualify (The Church of Marijuana is "out"), but the list
is long and growing (Wicca is "in")--and that trend may pose some unusual difficulties
for a Supreme Court bent on accommodating religion.

IV
Cyndi Simpson is a believer. She wants government support for Wicca because,
she argues, it is a religion constitutionally entitled to equal treatment with other religions.
If the Court continues to define religion expansively, it will overturn the board's refusal to
let her speak as violating the core Establishment Clause principle of nondiscrimination
among sects. But if the Court does so, it threatens to undermine the accommodationist
foundation of the Court's modern church-state jurisprudence.
For instance, the arguments that justify ceremonial deism rely on a notion of
innocuousness incompatible with a broad definition of religion. In effect, ceremonial
deism rests on the notion that the word "God" and other similar ritualistic expressions and
practices have lost religious significance. But the significance of such conduct cannot be
measured only by its continuing vitality for majority religious groups. That conduct may
have a different significance for minority religions; for some of these groups the
continued use of theistic ritual may be highly offensive.162 Moreover, if religious
practice can lose its significance through rote repetition, it stands to reason that it could,
under the right circumstances, regain spiritual vitality. The judicial recognition of
minority religious groups that appear to threaten longstanding cultural traditions might
162

See Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality toward Religion under the Establishment
Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C.L. REV. 1069 (1986) (calling for a
rigorous application of the endorsement test as a means of protecting the rights of religious minorities).
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well awaken dormant sensitivities. To take the most striking example, the Myers court,
as noted above, recognized that Satanism was "more likely than not" a religion. If I may
assume that Satanists worship the arch-enemy of God,163 it is difficult to see how, from
their perspective, government-sponsored use of God's name is not an endorsement of a
particular religion.164 It is equally difficult to see how the followers of God, faced with
real religious opposition, would continue to invoke their deity's name with rote repetition.
Minority religious groups will also be unimpressed by arguments that rely on
some form of cultural consensus, historical or contemporary. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly noted the increasingly pluralistic nature our society: that, too, is part of our
history; the preservation of minority rights is also part of our tradition. The Court will
have to consider how the fabric of our society has changed--and the role that the courts
have played in changing it. In light of case law acknowledging religious pluralism as part
of the cultural landscape, what was once "a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely
held among the people of this country" now may amount to the impermissible favoring of
one religion over another.165
163

See John Milton, PARADISE LOST 215 (Merritt Y. Hughes ed., Odyssey Press 1957) (1667):
To do ought good never will be our task,
But ever to do ill our sole delight,
As being contrary to his high will
Whom we resist. If then his providence
Out of our evil seek to bring forth good,
Our labor must be to pervert that end,
And out of good still to find means of evil.
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In Marsh v. Chambers, Justice Stevens noted that one of the prayers given by Nebraska's chaplain
celebrated Christ's death as "the hour when he triumphed over Satan's pride." 463 U.S. 783, 823 n.2 (1983)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The Court has long recognized that the pluralistic nature of the religious community must be taken into
consideration. See, e.g., School District of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("[O]ur religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse people than were our forefathers.
They knew differences chiefly among Protestant sects. Today the Nation is far more heterogeneous
religiously, including as it does substantial minorities not only of Catholics and Jews but as well of those
who worship according to no version of the Bible and those who worship no God at all. In the face of such
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Perhaps more disconcerting to the accommodationists on the Court is that an
expansive definition of religion undermines the political premises of nonpreferentialism.
The goal of accommodationist jurisprudential strategies is to provide "a meaningful
opportunity"166 for religious conduct. But that goal presupposes a great deal about
religious conduct. It envisions conduct that serves the public good. That premise is
made clear when Rehnquist quotes Thomas Cooley to the effect that "the same reasons of
state policy which induce the government to aid institutions of charity and seminaries of
instruction will incline it also to foster religious worship and religious institutions, as
conservators of the public morals and valuable, if not indispensable, assistants to the
preservation of the public order."167 There is a devious circularity here. If religion is
meant to conserve public morals, it must first embody those values; thus, it is really
public morality that defines "true" religion. Minority religious groups may be perceived
as subversive of the public order, but what basis would a nonpreferentialist Court have
for excluding them from the public business when it has so forcefully advocated
accommodation on a nondiscriminatory basis?168

profound changes, practices which may have been objectionable to no one in the time of Jefferson and
Madison may today be highly offensive to many persons, the deeply devout and the nonbelievers alike.)
(footnote and citation omitted). For the argument that religious pluralism makes some form of
accommodation necessary, see Beschel, supra, note 5, at 173.
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Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 89 (1985) (Burger, J., dissenting) (state statute permitting public school
prayer "endorses only the view that the religious observances of others should be tolerated and, where
possible, accommodated").
167
Id. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But cf. Madison, supra, note 107, at 303 ("If Religion be not
within [the] cognizance of Civil Government, how can its legal establishment be said to be necessary to
civil Government? What influence in fact have ecclesiastical establishments had on Civil Society? In
some instances they have been seen to erect a spiritual tyranny on the ruins of Civil authority; in many
instances they have been seen upholding the thrones of political tyranny; in no instance have they been seen
the guardians of the liberties of the people.").
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For a reading of the religion clauses advocating an originalist perspective, see Lee J. Strang, The
Meaning of "Religion" in the First Amendment, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 181 (2002) (contending that the original
meaning of religion as a monotheistic belief system should govern Free Exercise and Establishment Clause
cases).
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Even in an era of relative religious uniformity, the founders were sensitive to the
danger of establishment by government-sponsored social consensus.169 For Madison, the
Establishment Clause is a form of protection against majoritarian cultural tendencies.170
The normal social and political processes do not apply here. We may expect a degree of
obedience to social norms. We may require a degree of commitment to political
compromises. But the constitutional status of the Establishment Clause is uniquely
libertarian.171 The special status of religion derives from the sense of duty it imposes, a
duty higher (in Madison's words, "precedent both in order of time and degree"172) to "the
authority of the Society at large."173 If the rights of the minority are to be free from
trespass, Madison says, religion must be wholly exempt form the cognizance of civil
society. But when the Court fashions majoritarian doctrine that allows for government
support of religion, it threatens "to overleap the great Barrier which defends the rights of
the people."174 And when the Court expands the pool of constitutionally-sanctioned
religions (in part by leaving behind Madison's duty rationale), it ensures that such support
runs afoul of the constitutional principle, conceded by the most ardent nonpreferentialist,
that government may not endorse religion "where the endorsement is sectarian."175
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What looks like uniformity today did not seem so at the end of the eighteenth century. See James
Madison, Variety of Sects Secures Freedom for All, reprinted in THE COMPLETE MADISON 306 (Saul K.
Padover ed., Harper 1953) (asserting that freedom of religion in the United States arises from a multiplicity
of sects).
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See Madison, supra, note 107, at 300 (warning against trespass of minority religious rights).
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On the constitutional "asymmetry between politics and religion," see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and
Liberal Democracy, 59. U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 210 (1992). See also Steven G. Gey, Why is Religion
Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion under the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 176 (1990) (suggesting that religion is incompatible with
"constitutional rationalism").
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Id.
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In a pluralistic society, nonpreferentialism contains the seeds of its own undoing.
Unless the courts are willing to say someone's faith is not a true religion, the government
must dole out its largesse with an even hand. But by providing public support to diverse
religious groups, the government ensures that the ugly and divisive drama of religious
disagreement will be played out in the public square and at the public trough.176 It may
well be that the "struggle to separate political from ecclesiastical affairs"177 is bound to
continue, but the courts can and should contain that struggle within proper constitutional
limits. The place to start is with the resurrection of a metaphor meant to suggest that the
sacred and the secular can best be served when kept to their separate spheres. The place
to start is with the recognition that Jefferson's wall stands in need of a little repair.
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See, e.g., Davis, supra, note 95, at 1056 (describing the hostility of audience members attending a
meeting of the Dallas, Texas, city council at which a Wiccan priest was allowed to deliver the opening
prayer).
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Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 28 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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